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1 Introduction**
3.500.000.000.000 usd. That is the amount needed on an annual basis until 
the year 2050 to ensure that low-carbon energy supply will meet energy de-
mand in that year according to the International Energy Agency.1 Financing 
1 International Energy Agency, Perspectives for the Energy Transition – Investment Needs for 
a Low Carbon Energy System (Bonn: iea/irena, 2017), https://www.iea.org/publications/ 
insights/insightpublications/PerspectivesfortheEnergyTransition.pdf, accessed 1 November 
2018, p. 8.
* The authors would like to emphasize that the names of the authors appear in alphabetical 
order, both have contributed equally. 
** The Special Issue ‘International Law for the Sustainable Development Goals’ is a research 
outcome of the 2017–2018 Workshop Series ‘International Law for the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals’ organised by the Department of Transboundary Legal Studies, Faculty of Law, 
University of Groningen. Mando Rachovitsa and Marlies Hesselman led the organisation of 
these workshops. The series included 8 workshops which explored the role and relevance of 
international law to the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. The Spe-
cial Issue includes some of the papers presented at the workshops and papers submitted 
to an open Call for Papers. More information is available at https://www.rug.nl/rechten/
congressen/il4sdgs/. 
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and deploying renewable energy sources (res) will be vital in the coming de-
cades in light of attaining a range of Sustainable Development Goals (sdg) 
that were agreed upon by the international community, such as sustainable 
energy for all (sdg 7), sustainable economic growth (sdg 8), and mitigating 
the consequences of climate change (sdg 13).2 Given the magnitude of the re-
quired investments and the fact that large portions of state budgets are usually 
reserved for other policy objectives, it is beyond doubt that a significant part of 
the investments will have to be made by the private sector.
Indeed, the private sector already provided for 90 percent of the renewable 
energy investments in 2016 globally.3 This sector is not nearly as limited in de-
ciding how to spread its investments as the government is. Major oil, gas and 
energy companies, some of which with revenues exceeding usd 100 billion a year, 
can be of great importance in realizing a shift towards investments in renew-
able energy projects. Moreover, while current numbers are difficult to ascer-
tain, the investment portfolio of institutional investors who invest on behalf of 
their members, such as pension funds and insurance companies, was estimat-
ed at usd 160 trillion in recent history.4 Considering the size of the managed 
funds, institutional investors can play an important role and they have become 
more active in the renewable energy market recently.5 Other actors which are 
instrumental to develop large projects include banks and semi-public financial 
institutions such as development banks and export credit agencies. This is the 
case since companies borrow money to finance their activities as this allows 
them to invest in more projects at the same time, which should both increase 
their profits and spread their risks. In addition, there are usually tax benefits 
connected to interest payments which makes borrowing more attractive.
For large energy projects, with construction and operation costs of eur 1–3 
billion per project, expenditure for both debt and equity are typically high. 
2 In addition, financing and developing renewable energy projects can also contribute to sdg 
1 (no poverty), and sdg 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure).
3 irena and cpi, Global Landscape of Renewable Energy Finance (Abu Dhabi: International 
Renewable Energy Agency, 2018), p. 8.
4 TheCityuk, ‘uk Fund Management’, April 2018, https://www.thecityuk.com/assets/2018/
Reports-PDF/fe6b3af4b4/UK-fund-management.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, pp. 14–16.
5 ren21, Renewables 2017 Global Status Report (Paris: ren21 Secretariat2017), http://www.ren21 
.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/17-8399_GSR_2017_Full_Report_0621_Opt.pdf, accessed 
1 November 2018. Institutional investors do not enjoy unlimited discretion regarding their 
investment decisions. They are subject to fiduciary duties, which for different investors result 
in the formulation of different risk profiles. Moreover, in order to reduce risks and justify 
investment decisions, a diverse portfolio is most commonly assembled conform portfolio 
theory; Harry Markowitz, ‘Portfolio Selection’, Journal of Finance, 7/1: 77–91 (1952).
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For some developers, borrowing is a necessity because of a lack of equity. This 
does not have to be problematic. Especially when ‘project finance’ is used – 
meaning that lenders only have recourse against the assets of the project – the 
percentage of debt tends to be high, usually between 50 and 80 percent of the 
total costs of a project6 and sometimes as high as 90 percent.7 In the alter-
native of ‘corporate finance’ the debt percentages are usually lower and the 
exposure of project developers in this case extends beyond the project. It can 
be relatively expensive for project companies to attract debt using project fi-
nance in comparison to large corporations using corporate finance, especially 
when a project involves significant risks.
The primary reason to use project finance, which is often used in the res 
sector, is that a company cannot afford to extend liability to all of its assets, as 
this would negatively impact its credit rating and therefore increase the cost 
of debt and limit debt capacity.8 Lenders therefore play an important role in 
the realization of projects as the capital they provide is instrumental. They 
can often dictate the terms on which they are willing to provide this capital, 
especially when competition is limited. Because of the large amounts of mon-
ey involved, lenders generally require that they are granted comprehensive 
security packages and that a significant part of the cash flow of projects is to 
be used for debt payment obligations.9 Especially where the debt provided ex-
ceeds 70 percent of the total costs of a project, high debt payment obligations 
make the project relatively vulnerable to changes in cash flow.10 This is why 
both investors and lenders ensure, through an elaborate risk assessment, that 
6 Vicky Cox and Patrick Holmes, ‘Principal Loan Finance Documentation’ in John Dewar 
(ed.), International Project Finance Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2015), p. 298.
7 Clive Ransome and Geoffrey Dunnett, ‘Sources of Funding’ in Dewar, International Project 
Finance Law and Practice, p. 62.
8 Because of their involvement in the global financial crisis, credit rating agencies are not 
relied upon as much. Legal separation of projects remains, however, of importance in 
light of limiting liability of other corporate assets and thereby protecting the cost against 
which the sponsors can attract capital. Roger McCormick, ‘Project Finance’ in Sarah Pat-
erson and Rafal Zakrzewski (eds.), The Law of International Finance (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2017), p. 777; Stefano Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice: Designing, 
Structuring, and Financing Private and Public Projects (London: Elsevier Academic Press, 
2013), p. 3.
9 Philip Benger and Patrick Holmes, ‘Ancillary Finance Documentation’ in Dewar, Interna-
tional Project Finance Law and Practice, p. 463.
10 Cox and Holmes, ‘Principal Loan Finance Documentation’, pp. 299–300. This vulner-
ability is absent when corporate finance is used, because in that case the lenders have 
recourse against all assets of the company. This, of course, assumes that the company is 
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the risks which can cause detrimental changes to the cash flow are minimized 
and, where possible, hedged. Another result of the high percentages of debt 
attracted is that a reduction of the cost of debt has a very significant impact on 
the levelized cost of electricity produced from res projects. For example, tak-
ing common figures for an offshore wind farm, a decrease in the cost of capital 
by five percentage points, from ten to five percent as has approximately hap-
pened in the North Sea offshore wind sector, would result in a thirty percent 
decrease in the levelized cost of electricity over the lifetime of an installation.11 
Therefore, making capital available at lower costs contributes significantly to 
the competitiveness of res.
In particular for governments of countries that lack sufficient domestic 
financial resources or the required technology and knowledge, a primary 
concern is attracting private capital by increasing flows of foreign direct in-
vestment (fdi) to finance an energy transition. However, between 2013 and 
2016, an average of 93 percent of global private renewable energy investments 
remained within the country of origin.12 This invites the question what issues 
determine whether or not private sector actors are interested to invest in or ex-
tend loans for cross-boundary res projects. The main question that we will try 
to answer in this contribution is: How can investment treaties remove barriers 
to investment, as perceived by investors, in order to facilitate fdi and trade in 
the res supply chain?
Undoubtedly, a successful energy transition will depend on the adoption of 
favourable legal frameworks that incentivize investments in the res sector at 
both the national and international level. At the national level, one can think 
of support schemes, such as feed-in-tariffs (fits). This contribution will, how-
ever, concern policy instruments that may contribute to flows of fdi at the 
international level and more specifically, investment treaties.
Our analysis is based on the theory that a supportive and predictable invest-
ment climate will attract additional investments at lower cost by eliminating 
larger than the one project and has sufficient cash to, temporarily, deal with setbacks in 
cash flow from the project.
11 Giles Hundleby, ‘lcoe – Weighted Cost of Capital, (wacc)’, https://bvgassociates.com/
lcoe-weighted-average-cost-capital-wacc/, accessed 1 November 2018.
12 irena and cpi, Global Landscape of Renewable Energy Finance, p. 35. It should be noted 
that irena and cpi are not clear in the methodology used to reach this conclusion, while 
the methodology has significant impact on the calculation of the percentage of fdi. 
Many businesses operate worldwide and usually establish a physical and legal presence 
in the countries where they operate.
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barriers and reducing risks.13 This will primarily be explained from the inves-
tor’s micro-economic point of view by emphasizing the effects that legislation 
may have on individual investment decisions by making linkages to economic 
and corporate theory that explain corporate behaviour. It will be argued that 
these legal barriers and risks should be reduced along all segments of the 
supply chain of renewable energy technology in order to decrease the costs 
of res, including transaction costs and the costs of capital for res projects, 
and thereby facilitate additional investments. Although we focus primarily on 
international investment law, certain aspects may overlap with international 
trade law and we therefore emphasize the influence that investment measures 
may have on international trade. As a result of the micro-economic approach 
that is adopted, this contribution does not pretend to take into account the 
complete range of interests which have to be balanced by governments in their 
decision-making.14 The aim of this contribution is thus to analyse how fdi in 
the res sector may be increased through the use of international investment 
law. In this context, the benefits which increased fdi and trade in the res sec-
tor offer to host states will briefly be touched upon.
In section 2 this contribution first discusses a number of risks which res 
investors generally encounter and subsequently how contemporary interna-
tional investment law may reduce these risks and thus promote investments. 
In order to demonstrate the protection offered by such treaties in current 
practice, recent arbitration cases which were instigated following regulatory 
changes to the res support scheme in Spain are analysed. One of the main 
observations of this section is that contemporary investment law primarily 
provides ex-post investment protection and is thus highly reactive in nature. 
Section 3 will therefore critically reflect on a number of key issues faced by 
investors which international investment law currently does not (sufficiently) 
address: market access for foreign investors and the effects of local content 
requirements. By adopting a micro-economic approach this section includes 
an analysis of how international law can mitigate the concerns of investors and 
thus facilitate investments. Section 4 subsequently adopts a macro-economic 
13 Shannon Pratt and Roger Grabowski, ‘Relationship Between Risk and the Cost of Capital’ 
in Shannon Pratt et al. (eds.), Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples (Hoboken: Wiley, 
2014), pp. 70–87; René M. Stultz, ‘Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capi-
tal’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 12/3: 8–25 (1999).
14 The authors thus recognize that legislators may decide to make decisions which harm 
fdi, either in pursuit of other interests and benefits which the legislator prioritizes or 
because the legislator wishes to use different legislative tools to obtain res technology, 
knowledge and experience.
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approach and briefly examines the effects of liberalization in the res sector 
for host states. Particular emphasis is placed on explaining the benefits that 
may accrue in developing countries, by reference to business practice in the 
res sector. Finally, in section 5 we reflect and conclude how international law 
can play a role in unlocking private capital towards fdi in the renewable en-
ergy sector and thereby the realization of the sdgs.
2 Traditional International Investment Law: Protecting Foreign 
Investments
Since we aim to determine how investment treaties can remove barriers to 
fdi and trade in the res supply chain, it is important to first ascertain the 
contemporary relevance of investment treaties in the res sector. Although 
most bilateral investment treaties (bits), at least in name, concern investment 
promotion and protection, the emphasis of these treaties has historically been 
on investment protection and not so much on effective investment promo-
tion by, for example, the liberalization of fdi.15 Arguably though, these treaties 
can promote fdi by providing protection: If risks associated with an invest-
ment are reduced, investors may reduce risk premiums that are added to the 
required rate of return in their investment decisions and the decreased risks 
may make a particular investment attractive to a larger pool of investors while 
at the same time reducing the cost of capital.16
Most existing international investment agreements (iias) provide for pro-
tection against political and regulatory risks faced by investors by  regulating 
the relationship between states and foreign investors in much the same way 
that administrative law or human rights law does in many jurisdictions by 
 prescribing the rule of law.17 As such, iias protect investors against undue 
15 Krista N. Schefer, International Investment Law – Text, Cases and Materials (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2016), pp. 318–320.
16 Pratt and Grabowski, ‘Relationship Between Risk and the Cost of Capital’, pp. 70–87; 
Alexander Lehmann, ‘Country Risks and the Investment Activity of u.s. Multination-
als in Developing Countries’, imf wp/99/133, October 1999, https://www.imf.org/~/
media/Websites/IMF/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/_wp99133.ashx, 
accessed 1 November 2018, pp. 21–22; Stephen Arbogast and Praveen Kumar, ‘Financing 
Large Energy Projects’ in Betty Simkins et al. (eds.), Energy Finance and Economics: Anal-
ysis and Valuation, Risk Management, and the Future of Energy (Hoboken: Wiley, 2013), 
pp. 332–337.
17 See for example: Susan Karamanian, ‘Human Rights Dimensions in Investment Law’ 
in Erika de Wet et al. (eds.), Hierarchy in International Law: The Place of Human Rights 
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 government interference that adversely affect their investments. However, iias 
only do so for a specific group of entities, namely foreign investors that fall with-
in the scope of each specific iia. Substantive investment protection standards 
include, amongst others, non-discrimination principles, no expropriation 
without compensation, the obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment 
(fet) – which may include the protection of legitimate expectations – 
and the obligation to provide full protection and security. In addition to 
granting foreign investors substantive rights, most iias also provide for a rel-
atively effective dispute resolution mechanism in the form of Investor-State 
Dispute Settlement (isds) provisions that most often provide for internation-
al investment arbitration. Currently, the total number of iias exceeds 3.000, 
which includes bits as well as multilateral treaties, such as the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ect) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta).18
For investors, the decision whether or not to make an investment depends 
on a multitude of factors. One of the most important aspects related to any 
investment decision is an analysis of the risks associated with an investment. 
The greater the risks associated with an investment the higher the required 
rate of return, i.e. the minimum return an investor wants to make on an invest-
ment. The assessment of risks covers all facets of the project over the entire 
project lifetime, which can be a monumental task.19 Large investments are 
normally made on the basis of an elaborate assessment, taking into account all 
risks that can influence the profitability of an investment.
Roughly speaking, identified risks can be dealt with in three ways: They 
can be retained by the investor, transferred to counterparties or transferred to 
insurers.20 In corporate finance it is more common that risks are retained than 
when project finance is used.21 Of course this depends on the nature of the risk 
and the costs of transferring risk, as high costs are often the main factor not to 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 236–271; Chester Brown, ‘Investment Treaty 
Tribunals and Human Rights Courts Competitors or Collaborators?’, The Law and Prac-
tice of International Courts and Tribunals, 15/2: 287–304 (2016); Daniel Kalderimis, ‘Invest-
ment Treaty Arbitration as Global Administrative Law: What this Might Mean in Practice’ 
in Chester Brown et al. (eds.), Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press 2011), pp. 145–159.
18 unctad, World Investment Report 2016 (Geneva: unctad, 2016), p. 101.
19 To illustrate, a power developer indicated that his projects are documented through an 
average of 30.000 pages of tightly drawn contracts although unforeseen and problematic 
situations are still encountered. John Dewar and Oliver Irwin, ‘Project Risks’ in Dewar, 
International Project Finance Law and Practice, p. 85.
20 Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice, p. 43.
21 Ibid.
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transfer risks. When risks are retained, internal processes are set up to moni-
tor and manage the risks. Where project finance is used, the debt agreement 
includes financial covenants which provide – usually stringent – economic 
parameters within which the borrower can operate the project. These 
covenants include requirements regarding the cash flow of the project or the 
provision of information about certain (financial) events to the lenders, and 
also allow the lenders to monitor the project company’s financial position.22 
The distinction between corporate and project finance is of great importance 
here since completely internalized risks, whereby the borrower bears all the 
risks, are far less likely to be accepted by lenders in a project finance setting 
than in corporate finance. After all, if a production facility is unable to oper-
ate, for example due to an accident, in case of corporate finance it is possible 
that the company is able to use its other production facilities to comply with 
its financial obligations while, in the case of project finance, it will technically 
enter default when the facility is unable to operate for a prolonged period of 
time.23
Of the risks associated with every project, political and regulatory risks are 
major concerns.24 This statement holds true both with regards to investments 
in developing as well as developed countries. Energy investments are exposed 
to a relatively high level of political and regulatory risk as energy investments 
are usually made for the long term and the public and private interests involved, 
whether fiscal, financial, environmental, technical or social, are usually signifi-
cant. It is thus not surprising that uncertainty surrounding support policy has 
been named as a primary factor hindering res investments.25 As a by-product 
of the long lifetime of most energy projects, economic cycles change, elec-
tions are held and other significant political and social changes are expected 
to occur. In the past, especially investments in the oil and gas sector have been 
prone to the premature termination of concessions or expropriations without 
22 Cox and Holmes, ‘Principal Loan Finance Documentation’, pp. 296–297.
23 Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice, p. 43.
24 Dewar and Irwin, ‘Project Risks’, pp. 98–102; Philip Fletcher, ‘Approaching Legal Issues in 
a Project Finance Transaction’ in Dewar, International Project Finance Law and Practice, 
pp. 5–6 and 13–14; Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice, pp. 55–56.
25 Frankfurt School unep Collaborating Centre, ‘Global Trends in Renewable Energy Invest-
ment – 2012, https://www.circleofblue.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/UNEP_global 
-trends-in-renewable-energy-investment-June-2012.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, pp. 12, 
19 and 47.
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compensation.26 More recently, the renewable energy sector has also seen its 
fair share of investment disputes between host states and foreign investors.27
Thus far, most investments in renewable energy sources (res) have been 
driven by regulation, meaning that jurisdictions where favourable conditions 
were created for res investors have received significant amounts of fdi.28 
Since most forms of res have not been able to compete on price with more tra-
ditional sources of energy, many countries adopted support schemes to incen-
tivize res investments. However, if the economic viability of an investment 
depends on support measures, this also exposes the investment to a particular 
kind of regulatory risk, namely that the support measures will be altered dur-
ing the lifetime of the facility. In most current res investment disputes, these 
issues are at the heart of the dispute: financial support was reduced or altered 
for various reasons.29 Since many res projects are financed with a significant 
amount of debt, this means that substantial changes to the cash flow of a proj-
ect can cause a bankruptcy if financial obligations cannot be honoured.30
To exemplify the political and regulatory risks associated with res invest-
ments, which have manifested themselves in several countries, and the way 
contemporary investment law has dealt with them, the following section will 
discuss the country where investors were confronted with particularly harsh 
regulatory changes: Spain.
2.1 The Application of International Investment Protection Law in 
Renewable Energy Disputes: The Case of Spain
In order to give an impression of the practical relevance of rules on invest-
ment protection in the res sector, the regulatory framework of Spain, the sub-
sequent amendments thereto and the consequences for res investors will be 
introduced. Subsequently, a brief examination of various arbitral awards in-
volving Spain will follow. It will be concluded that at present, there is a lack of 
legal certainty in the application of norms of investment treaties.
26 Peter Cameron, International Energy Investment Law – The Pursuit of Stability (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 3–14.
27 Nikos Lavranos and Cees Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy Investment Disputes – Recent Devel-
opments and Implications for Prospective Energy Market Reforms’ in Martha Roggenkamp 
et al. (eds.), European Energy Law Report xii (Cambridge: Intersentia, forthcoming 2018).
28 Petri Mäntysaari, eu Electricity Trade Law – The Legal Tools of Electricity Producers in the 
Internal Electricity Market (Cham: Springer, 2015), p. 445. See also irena and cpi, Global 
Landscape of Renewable Energy Finance, p. 22.
29 Lavranos and Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy Investment Disputes’.
30 irena and cpi, Global Landscape of Renewable Energy Finance, p. 12.
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In 2007 the Spanish government enacted a very generous res support 
scheme, which provided for direct financial support in the form of a fit.31 
Royal Decree 661/2007 (rd 661/2007) foresaw in fits that were granted for 
the lifetime of a facility, although the fit was reduced after a given amount 
of years.32 Also, res generators were granted priority dispatch.33 In order for 
generators to be eligible for support under rd 661/2007, they had to fulfil a 
registration requirement.34
In 2007 it was already noted by one author that rd 661/2007 ‘guarantees 
very attractive profitability levels for [renewable electricity] investors. Further-
more, it will continue to be provided even when [res] plants are fully paid-
off, which will entail an unnecessary burden for consumers’.35 Indeed, under 
rd 661/2007 some investors in photovoltaic (pv) solar energy were eligible to 
receive as much as eur 0,44 per kWh.36 In late 2007 Spanish authorities were 
aware of the fact that investments in primarily solar energy were increasing 
rapidly.37 On the one hand, one could argue that the policy was successful; it 
31 The main purpose of fit policy is to provide investors certainty by ensuring guaranteed 
prices for a certain period of time for electricity produced from res, which can be done 
in multiple ways, see Toby Couture and Yves Gagnon, ‘An Analysis of Feed-in Tariff Re-
muneration Models: Implications for Renewable Energy Investment’, Energy Policy, 38/2: 
955–965 (2010).
32 Although rd 661/2007 did foresee in future tariff adjustments, these revisions were not 
intended to affect existing investments. See Article 44(3), Royal Decree 661/2007, Leg-
islation Development of the Spanish Electric Power Act, Volume 11, 2009, p. 117. Cees 
Verburg and Nikos Lavranos, ‘Recent Awards in Spanish Renewable Energy Cases and the 
Potential Consequences of the Achmea Judgment for intra-eu ect Arbitrations’ in Lou-
kas Mistelis et al. (eds.), European Investment Law and Arbitration Review (Leiden: Brill 
Nijhoff, forthcoming).
33 eu member states are currently held to provide priority dispatch to res pursuant to 
Article 16(1)(c) Directive 2009/28/ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 
April 2009 on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, but a repeal has 
been suggested in the winter package. In case electricity production exceeds consump-
tion, priority dispatch requires transmission system operators to minimise the curtail-
ment of electricity produced from res.
34 Articles 14 and 17(c), Royal Decree 661/2007, Legislation Development of the Spanish 
Electric Power Act, Volume 11, 2009, pp. 92–93 and 95.
35 Pablo del Río González, ‘Ten Years of Renewable Electricity Policies in Spain: An Analysis 
of Successive Feed-in Tariff Reforms’, Energy Policy, 36/8: 2917–2929 (2008), p. 2926.
36 Charanne and Construction Investments v. Spain, scc Case No. v 062/2012, Award, 21 
January 2016, para. 121.
37 Daniel Behn and Ole Kristian Fauchald, ‘Governments Under Cross-Fire? Renewable 
Energy and International Economic Tribunals’, Manchester Journal of International Law, 
12/2: 117–139 (2015), p. 121.
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has been said that ‘Spain alone accounted for over 50 percent of the installed 
pv solar in the world’ in 2008.38 On the other hand, one could also argue 
that if one support scheme attracts 50 percent of all pv investments world-
wide, it might be too generous and not necessarily be successful, but rather a 
tremendous financial liability.
A further complicating factor was that the costs of these fits could not be 
passed on to final electricity consumers in Spain because the electricity tar-
iff was regulated by the government. The difference between the regulated 
electricity tariff and the fit created a so-called ‘tariff deficit’, which was the 
amount paid to producers which could not be recouped from consumers.39
It has to be noted, however, that generous subsidies were not exclusively 
the cause of the tariff deficit. The tariff deficit existed before but was exacer-
bated by the financial and economic crises that had a significant impact on 
the Spanish economy.40 As a result of reduced economic activity, the demand 
for energy also declined which aggravated the deficit.41 According to the rating 
agency Moody’s, the tariff deficit amounted to a cumulative total of eur 28.8 
billion in 2013.42
After the ‘boom’ in res investments in Spain and the realization that the 
regulatory framework might not be financially sustainable, several legislative 
measures were adopted that were aimed at reducing the tariff deficit in the pe-
riod of 2008 to 2014. Many of these measures have given rise to countless legal 
proceedings, both domestically and internationally.43
In the period of 2008 to 2012 various measures were introduced that ad-
justed the favourable legal framework. These measures had, amongst others, 
38 Ibid.
39 Iñigo del Guayo Castiella, ‘Promotion of Renewable Energy Sources by Regions: The Case 
of the Spanish Autonomous Communities’ in Marjan Peeters et al. (eds.), Renewable 
Energy Law in the eu – Legal Perspectives on Bottom-Up Approaches (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2014), p. 67.
40 Iñigo del Guayo, ‘Energy Law in Spain’ in Martha Roggenkamp et al. (eds.), Energy Law 
in Europe – National, eu and International Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016), p. 1041.
41 Del Guayo Castiella, ‘Promotion of Renewable Energy Sources by Regions’, p. 67.
42 Global Credit Research, ‘Moody’s: Spanish Electricity System Heads Toward Sustain-
ability, as Electricity Tariff Deficit Debt Falls’, 14 March 2016, https://www.moodys.com/
research/Moodys-Spanish-electricity-system-heads-toward-sustainability-as-electricity 
-tariff--PR_345353, accessed 1 November 2018.
43 Behn and Fauchald, ‘Governments under Cross-Fire?’, pp. 122–123.
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the effect of reducing financial support for new plants,44 eliminating the fit 
from the twenty-fifth year onwards,45 introducing new technical requirements 
aimed at overcoming voltage dips in the network,46 limiting the amount of an-
nual hours that pv plants were entitled for support while producing electricity 
and the introduction of a toll for access to the electricity network,47 as well as 
the introduction of a 7 percent tax on electricity generation which included 
generation facilities that made use of res.48
More drastic measures followed in 2013 and 2014, which had the effect of 
completely repealing the legal regime on the basis of which the support was 
granted.49 Ultimately, in June 2014 a new regulatory regime concerning remu-
neration was laid down which entitled generators to a ‘reasonable rate of re-
turn’ that was ‘calculated on the basis of a hypothetical “efficient plant”’.50 The 
calculation parameters for this regime were established by ministerial order, 
44 Royal Decree 1578/2008; Del Río González, ‘Ten Years of Renewable Electricity Policies in 
Spain’, p. 2919.
45 In particular Article 3, Royal Decree 1565/2010, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 283, 2010, 
p. 97428.
46 Royal Decree 1565/2010, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 283, 2010, p. 97428.
47 Royal Decree Law 14/2010 and Article 2 First Transitory Provision, Royal Decree Law 
14/2010, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 312, 2010, p. 106386.
48 Article 8, Law 15/2012, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 312, 2012, p. 88081; Del Guayo, 
‘Energy Law in Spain’, p. 1042; Del Guayo Castiella, ‘Promotion of Renewable Energy 
Sources by Regions’, p. 68; Verburg and Lavranos, ‘Recent Awards in Spanish Renewable 
Energy Cases’.
49 First, Royal Decree Law 2/2013 (rdl 2/2013) eliminated the option of a fip and also 
changed the mechanism that was used to update fits. Several months later, Royal Decree 
Law 9/2013 (rdl 9/2013) was adopted, which amended the provision of the Law of the 
Electricity Sector of 1997 (les 1997) that had laid the legal foundation for the creation of 
the ‘Special Regime’ on the basis of which the later support schemes were based. Also, rd 
661/2007 was repealed and the system of fits and fips was eliminated and replaced by 
a system that provided ‘for ‘specific remuneration’ based on ‘standard’ (but not actual) 
costs per unit of installed power, plus standard amounts for operating costs. Law 24/2013, 
which was adopted in late 2013 superseded the les 1997 and ‘completely eliminated the 
distinction between the Ordinary and Special Regimes. See Article 1, Royal Decree Law 
2/2013. Article 1, Royal Decree Law 9/2013, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 167, 2013, p. 52106; 
Article 9 Single Derogatory Provision, Royal Decree Law 9/2013, Boletin Oficial del Estado, 
nr. 167, 2013, p. 52106; Eiser Infrastructure Limited and Energía Solar Luxembourg S.à r.l. 
v. Kingdom of Spain, icsid Case No. arb/13/36, Final Award, 4 May 2017, paras. 145–146; 
Verburg and Lavranos, ‘Recent Awards in Spanish Renewable Energy Cases’.
50 Article 11, Royal Decree 413/2014, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 140, 2014, p. 43876; Eiser v. 
Spain, para. 147.
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which was adopted around the same time.51 In the Eiser v. Spain case, the re-
muneration parameters were summarized as follows:
The tariff regime in rd 661/2007 is abandoned, substituting a new regime 
of reduced remuneration based on hypothetical ‘standard’ investment 
and operating costs and characteristics of hypothetical ‘efficient’ plants, 
with remuneration limited to an operating life of 25 years. Remuneration 
is calculated based on regulators’ projections of the revenues required to 
attain a prescribed lifetime pre-tax return of 7,398% based on the hypo-
thetical costs of a hypothetical standard installation. The prescribed rate 
of return is potentially subject to change every six years. Remuneration is 
based on capacity, not production, eliminating the incentive potentially 
available under rd 661/2007 to build more expensive but more produc-
tive plants. Remuneration is capped at the hypothetical production of a 
‘standard plant’. Payments already received by a facility under the prior 
regime can be credited against the lifetime remuneration due under the 
new one, thus allowing clawback of ‘excess’ amounts received under the 
prior regime.52
The 2013 and 2014 measures essentially replaced the old support scheme with 
a completely new one, where the remuneration parameters are fundamental-
ly different and to a large extent based on hypothetical assumptions that do 
not take into account the actual and individual characteristics of projects.53  
Moreover, this new regime was applied to existing facilities.54 For existing 
investments that deviate from the hypothetical assumptions on which the 
new remuneration scheme is based, the consequences could be very 
considerable.55
2.1.1 The Application of the Energy Charter Treaty
In response to all of these changes to the regulatory framework governing elec-
tricity production from res, international investors initiated almost forty ect 
arbitrations against Spain, making it the most sued nation under the ect. Al-
though many of these investors invoked various ect provisions, their main 
51 Ministerial Order iet/1045/2014 even explicitly uses the word ‘assumptions’: see Annex 
iii, Ministerial Order iet/1045/2014, Boletin Oficial del Estado, nr. 150, 2014, p. 46430.
52 Eiser v. Spain, para. 148. Formatting altered by authors.
53 Verburg and Lavranos, ‘Recent Awards in Spanish Renewable Energy Cases’.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
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argument is often the same; namely that their legitimate expectations, which 
are protected under the ect, have been violated by these regulatory changes. 
Although one will not find a reference to ‘legitimate expectations’ in the text 
of the ect itself, in ect arbitration it is a recognized element of the obligation 
of the state to provide ‘fair and equitable treatment’ (fet) to foreign investors 
on the basis of Article 10(1) ect.56
In the currently developing ect jurisprudence concerning res disputes, 
it seems that two distinct legitimate expectations are put forward by inves-
tors, although they have been formulated and analysed differently in the 
various cases. Firstly, that the investor had the legitimate expectation that the 
regulatory framework on the basis of which the investment was made, often 
rd 661/2007, would remain in force unchanged. Secondly, that if Spain was 
required to amend the regulatory framework, investors could have the le-
gitimate expectation that these changes would be implemented within the 
boundaries of fairness and equitableness. Arbitral awards regarding these two 
types of legitimate expectations in the context of res investment disputes will 
be analysed in the following sections.
2.1.2 The Legal Stability Expectation
In Spanish ect cases concerning regulatory changes in the res sector, the 
legal stability argument is usually phrased along the following lines: The inves-
tors made an investment on the basis of the existing regulatory framework, 
usually rd 661/2007 and government documents that promoted the regulatory 
framework to (foreign) investors. Subsequently, the Spanish state made chang-
es to this support scheme or even completely dismantled it, thereby adversely 
affecting the investors.
56 Article 10(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty (adopted 17 December 1994; entered into force 
16 April 1998), unts 2080: 95. Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, icsid 
Case No. arb/03/24, Award, 27 August 2008, paras. 176 and 219; Electrabel S.A. v. Republic 
of Hungary, icsid Case No. arb/07/19, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Lia-
bility, 30 November 2012, paras. 7.74–7.79; Electrabel S.A. v. The Republic of Hungary, icsid 
Case no. arb/07/19, Award, 25 November 2015, para. 155; aes Summit Generation Limited 
and aes-Tisza Erömü Kft v. The Republic of Hungary, icsid Case No. arb/07/22, Award, 
23 September 2010, paras. 9.3.8–9.3.17; aes Corporation and Tau Power B.V. v. Republic of 
Kazakhstan, icsid Case No. arb/10/16, Award, 1 November 2013, paras. 291, 397–412; Ana-
tolie Stati, Gabriel Stati, Ascom Group sa and Terra Raf Trans Traiding Ltd v. Kazakhstan, 
scc Case No. v (116/2010), Award, 19 December 2013, para. 941; Mamidoil Jetoil Greek Pe-
troleum Products Societe S.A. v. Republic of Albania, icsid Case No. arb/11/24, Award, 30 
March 2015, paras. 705–712.
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In practice, accepting the legal stability argument would essentially mean 
that ‘the fet standard grants investors a freestanding entitlement to the sta-
bility of the legal arrangements under which the investment was made’.57 The 
consequences of adopting this line of reasoning are therefore significant: Any 
regulatory change that would make the legal environment less appealing to in-
vestors could potentially lead to liability under iias.58 Given the implications 
that this argument has for states, the ect tribunals in the Charanne v. Spain, 
Antin v. Spain and Eiser v. Spain cases all rejected this argument.
In Charanne v. Spain the tribunal refused to acknowledge that a general legal 
framework could give rise to legitimate expectations that are protected under 
international law in the absence of a specific representation of the host state 
that the regulatory framework would not change.59 According to the tribunal:
[…] the Claimants could not have the legitimate expectation that the 
regulatory framework established by rd 661/2007 and rd 1578/2008 
would remain unchanged for the lifetime of their plants. Admitting 
the existence of such an expectation would, in effect, be equivalent to 
freeze the regulatory framework applicable to eligible plants, although 
circumstances may change. Any modification in the amount of the tariff 
or any limitation of the number of eligible hours would then constitute 
a violation of international law. In practice, the situation would be the 
same that if the State had signed a stabilisation clause or adopted a com-
mitment to not modify the regulatory framework. The Arbitral Tribunal 
cannot support such a conclusion.60
The tribunals in Eiser v. Spain and Antin v. Spain would make comparable 
statements.61
The awards in the Charanne and Eiser cases were decided and made public 
in 2016 and 2017 respectively. In that light it is notable that in early 2018 the ect 
tribunal in Novenergia v. Spain did accept a claim by investors phrased along 
similar lines. In essence, the Novenergia tribunal accepted that rd 661/2007 
57 Jonathan Bonnitcha, Substantive Protection under Investment Treaties (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2014), p. 184.
58 Ibid.
59 Charanne v. Spain, para. 499.
60 Ibid., para. 503.
61 Eiser v. Spain, para. 362; Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg S.à.r.l. and Antin Energia 
Termosolar B.V. v. Kingdom of Spain, icsid Case No. arb/13/31, Award, 15 June 2018, paras. 
530, 531 and 538.
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and several other documents regarding the Spanish res policy – the very same 
documents as in the Charanne and Eiser cases – were a credible source to base 
legitimate expectations on that are protected under the ect.62 This is some-
what surprising given the fact that none of these documents were specifically 
directed at the investor, something the Novenergia tribunal itself would ac-
knowledge in its award.63 Besides deviating from factually comparable cases 
such as Charanne and Eiser, the Novenergia award deviates from nearly all 
previous ect cases concerning legitimate expectations.64 This could greatly 
expand the scope of the ects fet standard.
Another case where this argument was accepted was Masdar v. Spain. This 
investor had invested in three concentrated solar power plants in late 2008 and 
early 2009.65 In this case, the investor contacted the authorities in 2010 while 
regulatory changes were ongoing and sought confirmation that its projects 
would be subject to the 2007 regime.66 Contrary to other Spanish ect cases, 
the project companies of Masdar received explicit confirmation from the 
authorities that its investments would indeed receive remuneration on the ba-
sis of rd 661/2007.67 In the light of such factual circumstances, the tribunal 
considered that the investors could have the legitimate expectation that the 
benefits of that scheme would remain ‘unaltered’.68 Masdar would eventually 
be awarded over eur 64 million in damages.
2.1.3 The Legitimate Expectation that Regulatory Changes will be 
Implemented within the Boundaries of Fairness and Equitableness
The second argument, that a state violates legitimate expectations of investors 
when regulatory changes exceed the boundaries of fairness and equitableness, 
62 Novenergia ii – Energy & Environment (sca) (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg), sicar v. 
The Kingdom of Spain, scc Arbitration (2015/063), Final Arbitral Award, 15 February 2018, 
paras. 666–681; Lavranos and Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy Investment Disputes’.
63 Novenergia v. Spain, para. 715.
64 Plama v. Bulgaria, para. 176; Electrabel v. Hungary, Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable 
Law and Liability, paras. 7.76–7.78; Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. The Republic of 
Tajikistan, scc Case No. v (064/2008), Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 2 Sep-
tember 2009, paras. 200–202; aes v. Hungary, paras. 9.3.17–9.3.18. aes v. Kazakhstan, paras. 
289–291.
65 Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief u.a. v. Kingdom of Spain, icsid Case No. arb/14/1, 
Award, 16 May 2018, para. 5.
66 Ibid., para. 123.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid., paras. 511–522.
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is often put forward as a subsidiary argument. In Charanne v. Spain, the inves-
tors argued as follows:
[…] the Claimants submit in this regard that ‘the legitimate expectations 
of the investor […] are frustrated, even in the absence of specific com-
mitments, when the receiving State performs acts incompatible with a 
criterion of economic reasonableness, with public interest or with the 
principle of proportionality’.69
The tribunal accepted the rationale behind this approach and stated that 
‘an investor has a legitimate expectation that, when modifying the existing 
regulation based on which the investment was made, the State will not act un-
reasonably, disproportionately or contrary to the public interest’.70 Concerning 
proportionality, ‘the Arbitral Tribunal considers that this criterion is satisfied 
as long as the changes are not capricious or unnecessary and do not amount 
to suddenly and unpredictably eliminate the essential characteristics of the 
existing regulatory framework’.71
In the end, the Charanne tribunal would also reject this argument since it 
believed that the 2010 measures, the only measures over which the Charanne 
tribunal had jurisdiction, merely altered certain aspects of the legal regime 
without eliminating the fundamental characteristics of the regulatory frame-
work. Nevertheless, as the first ruling in an ect case concerning res, the award 
was carefully read by other ect tribunals. The endorsement that regulatory 
changes may violate the fet standard – even in the absence of representa-
tions made by the host State – may have far reaching consequences for ect 
contracting parties. In late 2016, an ect tribunal in the res case Blusun v. Italy, 
addressed this issue with reference to the Charanne award. Interestingly, the 
Blusun tribunal quite openly criticized the proposed standard of review of the 
Charanne tribunal, which held that regulatory changes should not be imple-
mented unreasonably, disproportionately or contrary to the public interest:
Of the three criteria suggested in Charanne, ‘public interest’ is largely in-
determinate and is, anyway, a judgement entrusted to the authorities of 
the host state. Except perhaps in very clear cases, it is not for an invest-
ment tribunal to decide, contrary to the considered view of those author-
ities, the content of the public interest of their state, nor to weigh against 
69 Charanne v. Spain, para. 513.
70 Ibid., para. 514.
71 Ibid., para. 517.
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it the largely incommensurable public interest of the capital-exporting 
state. The criterion of ‘unreasonableness’ can be criticized on similar 
grounds, as an open-ended mandate to second-guess the host state’s 
policies. By contrast, disproportionality carries in-built limitations and is 
more determinate. It is a criterion which administrative law courts, and 
human rights courts, have become accustomed to apply to governmental 
action.72
Therefore, the Blusun tribunal held that ‘[i]n the absence of a specific com-
mitment, the state has no obligation to grant subsidies such as feed-in tariffs, 
or to maintain them unchanged once granted. But if they are lawfully granted, 
and if it becomes necessary to modify them, this should be done in a manner 
which is not disproportionate to the aim of the legislative amendment, and 
should have due regard to the reasonable reliance interests of recipients who 
may have committed substantial resources on the basis of the earlier regime’.73
On the basis of the Blusun award, one could thus argue that the ect protects 
res investors against disproportionate measures that reduce support to res 
investors.
In the Eiser case, the tribunal would come to the conclusion that the regula-
tory changes exceeded the boundaries of fairness and equitableness in viola-
tion of the ect’s fet standard:
Taking account of the context and of the ect’s object and purpose, the 
Tribunal concludes that Article 10(1)’s obligation to accord fair and eq-
uitable treatment necessarily embraces an obligation to provide funda-
mental stability in the essential characteristics of the legal regime relied 
upon by investors in making long-term investments. This does not mean 
that regulatory regimes cannot evolve. Surely they can. […] However, 
the Article 10(1) obligation to accord fair and equitable treatment means 
that regulatory regimes cannot be radically altered as applied to existing 
investments in ways that deprive investors who invested in reliance on 
those regimes of their investment’s value.74
The tribunal considered that the introduction of a new remuneration method-
ology for fits that did not take into account actual characteristics of individual 
72 Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italian Republic, icsid Case No. 
arb/14/3, Final Award, 27 December 2016, para. 318.
73 Ibid., para. 319.
74 Eiser v. Spain, para. 382.
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investments, effectively and retroactively prescribed design standards for fa-
cilities built years before.75 As a result of this new remuneration methodology, 
revenues decreased by 66 percent which also adversely affected the value of 
the investment: while the investor had invested eur 125 million the value of 
the investment was reduced to eur 4 million.76 In the end, the tribunal would 
award Eiser eur 128 million in damages.
The standard of review as adopted by the Eiser tribunal, which focuses on wheth-
er measures eliminated essential characteristics of the regulatory framework, 
received the approval of the tribunal in Antin v. Spain.77 Since the new 
framework made use of a remuneration methodology that did not provide 
the fits on the basis of identifiable criteria, but rather made use of standard 
assumptions that were based on governmental discretion, the tribunal consid-
ered that the regulatory changes exceeded the boundaries of the fet obliga-
tion as the regime was not ‘aligned to the representations previously made by 
Spain regarding the stability of the legal and economic regime application to 
re[s] projects in order to induce investments’ in the solar sector.78 As a result 
of violating the ect, Spain was ordered to compensate Antin eur 112 million 
in damages.
The Novenergia v. Spain tribunal would address the findings of the Eiser tri-
bunal and disagree with the proposed standard of review.
The Tribunal disagrees with the approach adopted by the arbitral tribu-
nal in Eiser, […]. In the Tribunal’s view, the assessment of whether the 
fet standard has been breached is a balancing exercise, where the state’s 
regulatory interests are weighed against the investors’ legitimate expec-
tations and reliance. It is not simply sufficient to look at the economic 
effect that the challenged measures have had. Destruction of the value 
of the investment is clearly determinative in the assessment of whether 
a state has breached Article 13 [Expropriation] of the ect, but it is but 
one of several factors to consider when determining whether a state has 
breached Article 10(1) of the ect. Nevertheless, in the Tribunal’s opinion, 
the economic effect on a claimant’s investment is an important factor 
in the balancing exercise pursuant to Article 10(1) as well, as it can go 
75 Ibid., para. 414.
76 Ibid., paras. 151 and 417.
77 Antin v. Spain, para. 531.
78 Ibid., paras. 562–573.
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towards showing a change in the essential characteristics of the legal re-
gime relied upon by investors in making long-term investments.79
Rather, the Novenergia tribunal emphasized that the Spanish measures were so 
‘radical and unexpected’ that they ‘fell outside the acceptable range of legisla-
tive and regulatory behaviour’ as they ‘entirely transform[ed] and alter[ed] the 
legal and business environment under which the investment was […] made’.80 
The resulting ‘significant damaging economic effect’ on the investment was 
sufficient to establish a breach of the fet standard.81 The Novenergia tribunal 
thus adopted a slightly different standard of review. For example, concerning 
the effects of regulatory changes on an investment, the standard of review as 
proposed by the Novenergia tribunal entails a lower threshold of liability since 
the measures do not have to destroy the value of an investment, but rather 
cause significant damaging economic effect upon it. Novenergia would even-
tually be awarded eur 53 million in damages.
2.2 Observations Concerning the Application of Contemporary 
Investment Treaties in the res Sector
On the basis of the ect awards discussed above, one can conclude that an 
iia like the ect can provide effective protection for investors against regula-
tory changes that alter fundamental characteristics of the existing support 
scheme, for example by applying new rules to existing investments with the 
consequence of causing economic damage to investors. This is highly relevant 
in a sector where many investments still require subsidies for their economic 
viability. Despite the fact that the importance of financial support is decreas-
ing due to increased competitiveness of res, subsidized res generators will 
remain active in electricity markets for the next decades. Also, reforms in the 
electricity markets of the European Union (eu) are currently looming with po-
tential consequences for res investors. For instance, rules on priority dispatch 
of res in the eu will most likely change in the near future.82 Depending on 
79 Novenergia v. Spain, para. 694.
80 Ibid., para. 695.
81 Ibid.
82 Cf. Article 16 of the 2009 Renewable Energy Directive of the European Union to Article 
20 of the proposed Renewable Energy Directive. Article 16, Directive 2009/28/ec of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the Promotion of the Use of 
Energy from Renewable Sources and Amending and Subsequently Repealing Directives 
2001/77/ec and 2003/30/ec [2009] oj L140/16; Article 20, Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Promotion of the Use of Energy from 
Renewable Sources (recast), com(2016) 767 final/2.
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how these rules are implemented in relation to existing investments and the 
consequences thereof, new res investment disputes could arise.83
As the awards nevertheless also show, the lack of consistency undermines 
the predictability of the application of the ect. Of course, this lack of legal cer-
tainty and predictability might have adverse consequences for states, as they 
might become uncertain what legislative changes may be implemented with-
out violating international obligations, as well as for investors who might not 
be able to predict precisely what is protected under the treaty. In that regard, 
before iias can fulfil their potential of mitigating investments risks, it is desir-
able that the application of these treaties becomes more predictable.
Of course, not all risks associated with an investment can be addressed by 
investment protection rules as laid down in iias. There are many other risks, 
such as supply, operation, and technical risks that fall squarely within the 
sphere of commercial risk that any entrepreneur bears. As such, most contem-
porary iias that provide for investment protection merely provide for protec-
tion against political and regulatory risk, as the awards above demonstrate. 
This means that the iia regime is highly reactive in nature, which is to say that 
investors will rely on it after an investment has been made, and a dispute has 
arisen and, potentially, their investment has already gone south. Discriminato-
ry barriers to investment are often not addressed and the legal framework does 
not necessarily facilitate investments, it merely protects them once made. In 
light of these shortcomings, it is not surprising that empirical research shows 
that there is not a strong correlation between the conclusion of iias and flows 
of fdi. A recent meta-analysis held that a number of studies found that iias 
probably do have some positive influence on flows of fdi while several studies 
argued to the contrary.84 Also, the positive effect was primarily visible in the 
extractive industries sector and not so much in high-tech sectors.85
Because of the emphasis on post-establishment investment protection in 
contemporary iias, foreign investors may thus lawfully be confronted with 
a variety of rules set by legislators that can increase risks and constitute de 
facto barriers to investment and trade. This deficiency in contemporary iias 
83 Lavranos and Verburg, ‘Renewable Energy Investment Disputes’.
84 Jonathan Bonnitcha, Assessing the Impacts of Investment Treaties: Overview of the Evidence 
(Winnipeg, mb: iisd, 2017), https://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/assess-
ing-impacts-investment-treaties.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, pp. 3–4. As noted in this 
report, these studies ‘face a range of methodological challenges’ as a result of which the 
causality between the conclusion of iias and flows of fdi is difficult to prove.
85 Ibid.
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constitutes unutilized potential for such treaties to contribute to the realiza-
tion of the sdgs.
3 The Way Forward: A Holistic Approach to Investment and Trade  
in the Renewable Energy Sector
It is beyond doubt that in order to successfully realize the energy transition 
to res, very significant investments are required for decades to come. In or-
der to facilitate these investments, policy makers should aim at creating sup-
portive and predictable legal frameworks; not only domestically but also 
internationally. Although a vast majority of the investments in res projects 
around the globe are financed domestically, the value chain of res genera-
tion equipment and projects is very much internationally organized.86 For 
example, although China is both the largest manufacturer of pv cells and has 
the highest installed capacity, this does not mean that all Chinese pv mod-
ules are purely domestically sourced.87 When taking into account chemicals 
production, electrical components manufacturing, and the production of wa-
fers and crystalline silicon, the picture looks completely different with leading 
firms based in countries such as Germany, the United States, Norway, South 
Korea, Austria and Japan.88 Original Equipment Manufacturers (oem) of wind 
turbines headquartered in China, Germany, the United States, Denmark, and 
Spain account for over 80 percent of the market.89 This means that it is quite 
86 oecd, oecd Business and Finance Outlook 2016 (Paris: oecd Publishing, 2016), p. 159; 
oecd, Overcoming Barriers to International Investment in Clean Energy: Green Finance 
and Investment (Paris: oecd Publishing, 2015), pp. 59–60.
87 iea, Snapshot of Global Photovoltaics Markets 2016, Report iea pvps T1–31:2017, http://
www.iea-pvps.org/fileadmin/dam/public/report/statistics/IEA-PVPS_-_A_Snapshot_of 
_Global_PV_-_1992-2016__1_.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, pp. 5 and 10. See also Medium, 
Solar Economics, ‘Part 2: Mapping the Global Value Chain’, 21 September 2017, https://
medium.com/@solar.dao/solar-economics-part-2-mapping-the-global-value-chain-ec-
57c1b23f2, accessed 1 November 2018.
88 Medium, ‘Mapping the Global Value Chain’.
89 Paul Dvorak, ‘Report: Wind Turbine oems Set for More M&A as Chinese Companies 
Take the Lead’, 24 March 2016, https://www.windpowerengineering.com/mergers-ac-
quisitions/report-wind-turbine-oems-set-ma-chinese-companies-take-lead/, accessed 1 
November 2018.
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likely that international parties will be involved in the value chain of res proj-
ects, even if that project is domestically financed.90
Of course, when one argues that states should strive to facilitate res in-
vestments by creating a supportive and predictable international legal frame-
work, the obvious subsequent question is what should such a framework take 
into account? Arguably, it should take into account the business custom and 
practice of the res sector. In particular, it should combine rules governing 
investment with those governing trade. Since the failure of the International 
Trade Organization in the late 1940’s, the international rules concerning trade 
and investment have developed almost separately into two almost distinct 
‘fields’ of international law.91 In practice, however, trade and investment go 
hand in hand, especially in an increasingly globalized world where goods are 
traded in global value chains.92
According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(oecd), the value chain of res generation equipment is increasingly globally 
organised; this means that pv panels and wind turbines contain components 
that originate from numerous jurisdictions.93 Furthermore, it is common 
90 Chiara Criscuolo et al., ‘Renewable Energy Policies and Cross-Border Investment: Evi-
dence from M&A in Solar and Wind Energy’, cpb Discussion Paper 288, 2014, https://
www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/publicaties/download/dp288-shestalova-renewable- 
energy-policies.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, pp. 12 and 15.
91 Mark Wu, ‘The Scope and Limits of Trade’s Influence in Shaping the Evolving Internation-
al Investment Regime’ in Zachary Douglas et al. (eds.), The Foundations of International 
Investment Law: Bringing Theory into Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 
p. 172. It has to be acknowledged that increasingly comprehensive free trade agreements 
include rules on trade and investment.
92 On the relationship between trade, investment, and global value chains, see Sébastien 
Miroudot, Dorothée Rouzet and Francesca Spinelli, ‘Trade Policy Implications of Global 
Value Chains: Case Studies’, oecd Trade Policy Papers, No. 161 (2013); oecd, wto and 
unctad, ‘Implications of Global Value Chains for Trade, Investment, Development and 
Jobs’, 6 August 2013, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/unctad_oecd_wto_2013d1 
_en.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, pp. 21–25; Rainer Lanz and Sébastien Miroudot, ‘Intra-
Firm Trade: Patterns, Determinants and Policy Implications’, oecd Trade Policy Working 
Paper No. 114, 24 June 2011, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5kg9p39lrwnn-en.pd
f?expires=1543924229&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=3D4F9B95B4CF574EA39A6B
FC915CE7E7, accessed 1 November 2018; National Board of Trade, ‘Global Value Chains 
and Services – An Introduction’, February 2013, https://www.kommers.se/Documents/
dokumentarkiv/publikationer/2013/rapporter/report-global-value-chains-and-services 
-an-introduction.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, p. 5.
93 oecd, Business and Finance Outlook, p. 159; oecd, Overcoming Barriers to International 
Investment in Clean Energy, pp. 59–60.
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practice that oems of pv panels and wind turbines sell hardware in combi-
nation with services contracts that provide for transport, construction, and 
maintenance.94
As the res sector involves technologies and knowledge which is in the hands 
of a relatively select group of companies located in a relatively limited number 
of countries, a failure to acknowledge the interrelatedness between trade in 
goods and services and investment may raise risks associated with technology, 
planning, design, and construction as well as raise prices more generally.95 This 
in turn also means that a barrier to either investment or trade in goods and/or 
services may de facto become a barrier to all three.
Considering the last decade, it seems that many states have seen the res in-
dustry as an appealing emerging economic ‘pie’ of which they all want a piece 
because of its potential to deliver high-tech jobs, research, and development 
more generally.96 Numerous states have enacted protectionist legislation to 
that end which overlooks the complexities of the value chain of res genera-
tion equipment and project development, undermines economic efficiency 
and may even have counterproductive effects.97 According to the oecd, the 
use of protectionist legislation, either in the form of local content require-
ments (lcrs) or the application of trade remedies, affecting the res sector has 
been on the rise since 2009.98
These measures have the potential of raising the costs of inputs for res 
projects, which undermines the competitiveness of res technologies, while 
also exposing investors to additional risks, such as unnecessary technologi-
cal or counterparty risks, which may lead to increased capital and transaction 
94 United States International Trade Commission, ‘Renewable Energy and Related Services: 
Recent Developments’, Investigation No. 332–534, August 2013, https://www.usitc.gov/
publications/332/pub4421.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, pp. xix and xx.
95 Ronald Steenblik and Massimo Geloso Grosso, ‘Trade in Services Related to Climate 
Change: An Exploratory Analysis’, oecd Trade and Environment Working Papers 2011/03, 
26 May 2011, https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5kgc5wtd9rzw-en.pdf?expires=154
3924340&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=787991DB01C83C919E83A9F9607F7F22, ac-
cessed 1 November 2018, p. 4.
96 Joachim Monkelbaan, ‘Using Trade for Achieving the sdgs: The Example of the Environ-
mental Goods Agreement’, Journal of World Trade, 51/4: 575–603 (2017), p. 584; Ricardo 
Meléndez-Ortiz and Mahesh Sugathan, ‘Enabling the Energy Transition and Scale-Up of 
Clean Energy Technologies: Options for the Global Trade System – Synthesis of the Policy 
Options’, Journal of World Trade, 51/6: 933–958 (2017), p. 937.
97 oecd, Business and Finance Outlook, pp. 158–159. oecd, Overcoming Barriers to Interna-
tional Investment in Clean Energy, p. 50.
98 Ibid.
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costs.99 Needless to say, the higher the amount res goods and services have 
to be imported in a given jurisdiction, the greater the need for a facilitative 
trade and investment policy. According to the oecd, especially solar and wind 
projects in the least-developed countries are reliant on imported goods and 
services because of the lack of a local industry.100
The importance of an international investment regime, which provides for 
the effective liberalization of fdi instead of mere post-establishment invest-
ment protection, will be further elaborated by reference to the following spe-
cific aspects: market access and investment liberalization, and lcrs imposed 
by host states.
3.1 Market Access and Investment Liberalization
For any investor looking to make an investment, it is of profound importance 
to examine whether regulatory barriers are in place in a particular jurisdiction. 
For example, foreign investments may be subject to strict regulation accord-
ing to national law, which means that significant de facto or de jure barriers 
may exist. However, in the absence of any commitments to the contrary, states 
are under no obligation to admit foreign investors or to provide them market 
access in a non-discriminatory manner.101 While the possibility exists for in-
vestors to lobby and negotiate market access, possibly in cooperation with 
home state governments or other interested parties, this is – as a rule – a cum-
bersome and lengthy process with uncertain outcomes and which, even if 
successful, significantly increases transaction costs. Transaction costs in this 
context are the costs associated with a certain undertaking which, if too high, 
may prevent desirable exchanges from taking place which means that an 
99 Trade remedy measures, such as unfair anti-dumping measures, can directly increase the 
costs of inputs of res projects as, for example, imported solar panels become more ex-
pensive. lcrs can expose investors to unnecessary technological and counterparty risks: 
Technological risks may increase if foreign investors are compelled to make use of domes-
tic hardware when a country does not possess a res industry with a proven track record. 
Likewise, if foreign investors are compelled to cooperate with domestic contractors that 
lack experience in developing res projects, risks associated with the investment may in-
crease which is likely to lead to an increased cost of capital.
100 Steenblik and Grosso, ‘Trade in Services Related to Climate Change’, p. 10.
101 Anna Joubin-Bret, ‘Admissions and Establishment in the Context of Investment Protec-
tion’ in August Reinisch (ed.), Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press 2008), p. 10; Rudolf Dolzer and Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International 
Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 80–81.
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investor might refrain from investing.102 In order to resolve issues of market 
access, iias may contain commitments to this end.
However, most of the iias that are currently in force, including the ect and 
thousands of bits, do not regulate market access. Rather, they only provide for 
investment protection for those investments ‘which the host State has unilat-
erally decided to admit’.103 This means that those iias do not liberalize flows 
of fdi and that foreign investors may lawfully be confronted with all sorts of 
measures that obstruct market entrance. In practice this translates into the 
reality that foreign investors may be completely denied access to a country 
regardless of its potential for renewable energy and the existence of a bit. 
Obviously, if investors are not allowed to enter a country, they cannot and will 
not make an investment.
Although a minority, there are iias that do provide for market access and 
various treaty drafting techniques exist to that end. The nafta is an example, 
where the non-discrimination regimes as embodied in the national treatment 
and most favoured nation provisions are extended to the pre-establishment 
phase of an investment. As stated in Article 1102 nafta:
Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less 
favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors 
with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.
Similar approaches can be found in recent comprehensive trade agreements, 
such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (cptpp) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agree-
ment (ceta).104 The ceta combines this with a provision that very explicitly 
provides for market access.105 In order to balance market access rights with 
public policy objectives of host states, exceptions to the non-discrimination 
102 For more information on transaction costs theory, see Douglas C. North, ‘Transaction 
Costs, Institutions, and Economic History’ Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Eco-
nomics 140/1: 7–17 (1984); Oliver E. Williamson, ‘The Economics of Organization: The 
Transaction Cost Approach’, American Journal of Sociology 87: 548–577 (1981).
103 Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, p. 81.
104 Articles 9.4 and 9.5 of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement (adopted 8 March 2018; not yet in force). Articles 8.6 and 8.7 of the Compre-
hensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European Union-Canada) (adopted 30 October 
2016; not yet in force).
105 Article 8.4 of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European 
Union-Canada).
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rules are often incorporated in the treaty as in practice no state ‘will grant un-
limited [market] access to foreign investors’.106 This statement even holds true 
for the liberalization of investments within the eu, arguably the most liberal 
international investment regime in existence.107
In practice, negotiating parties to an iia that does liberalize fdi can do so 
by, for example, identifying economic sectors to which the non-discrimination 
regime applies (opt-in system), or in principle apply the non-discrimination 
regime to all economic sectors subject to certain exceptions (opt-out); with 
the latter approach most likely to be more liberal, transparent, and ambitious 
than the former.108 Also, even when states decide to allow exceptions to 
non-discrimination, these exceptions can be subject to far reaching provisions, 
such as standstill and ratchet clauses.109
Common discriminatory barriers to fdi may include restrictions on land 
ownership by foreigners, domestic equity participation requirements, screen-
ing procedures, technology transfer requirements, and economic needs tests.110 
Non-discriminatory barriers are also manifold, such as a lack of transparency, 
regulatory unpredictability, excessive bureaucracy, lack of efficient enforce-
ment of laws and regulations, ineffective governance, and a lack of an efficient 
and independent national judiciary.111
Where it concerns market access for res investors, the importance of 
market access for trade in related goods and services in combination with in-
vestment cannot be understated, as any res project will most likely involve 
106 Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, p. 81.
107 Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), pp. 203–204.
108 Ibid.
109 See for example Article 8.15(1) of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(European Union-Canada). On the basis of a standstill clause, non-conforming measures 
with the non-discriminatory treatment regime may not be amended after the conclusion 
of the treaty in a way that would increase the inconsistency. On the basis of the ratch-
et clause, a non-conforming measure that is amended after the entry into force of the 
agreement – which reduces the inconsistency with the non-discriminatory regime of 
the agreement – may not subsequently be amended again in a way that increases the 
inconsistency, not even to the extent as existed at the time the treaty was negotiated.
110 United States International Trade Commission, ‘Renewable Energy and Related Ser-
vices’, pp. 2–22; Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Investment Facilitation 
Toolbox (Brussels: Energy Charter Secretariat, 2017), p. 3; Joachim Monkelbaan, ‘Trade 
in Sustainable Energy Services’, October 2013, https://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/
news/2013/10/trade-in-sustainble-energy-services.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, pp. 
41–42.
111 Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Investment Facilitation Toolbox, pp. 3–5.
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imported goods and/or services, although this may vary by technology and 
country concerned.112 Especially with regards to services much progress can 
be made since the current international trading regime is not very ambitious, 
which is unfortunate since it has been said that ‘the size of sustainable en-
ergy services is bigger than the market for related goods’.113 When oems sell 
res hardware in tandem with services, such as construction and maintenance, 
trade barriers can constitute significant obstacles regardless of the mode in 
which the service is supplied.114 This is all the more pertinent as the expertise 
in res technology and related services such as installation, maintenance and 
decommissioning are not readily available in all countries, while the success 
of res projects depends on it.115 Especially the inability of res firms to ‘set 
up a commercial presence in a foreign country or temporarily move services 
providers there, continue to hamper efforts by providers of renewable energy 
services to penetrate foreign markets’.116 That the aforementioned method to 
supply services is closely related to investment is self-explanatory: Establishing 
a local commercial presence by definition requires an investment. In the ceta 
for example, trade in services by establishing commercial presence is therefore 
regulated through the investment chapter.117
3.2 Local Content Requirements
Another example which demonstrates that an international investment re-
gime, which is limited to post-establishment investment protection, is insuf-
ficient, is formed by lcrs, or trade related investment measures as they are 
referred to in the context of the World Trade Organization (wto).118 In quite a 
few states, investors have to meet a specified amount of local content in order 
112 Steenblik and Grosso, ‘Trade in Services Related to Climate Change’, pp. 4 and 9.
113 Monkelbaan, ‘Trade in Sustainable Energy Services’, p. vii.
114 Ibid., p. xx.
115 Steenblik and Grosso, ‘Trade in Services Related to Climate Change’, p. 4.
116 Ibid.
117 Panagiotis Delimatsis, ‘The Evolution of the eu External Trade Policy in Services – ceta, 
ttip, and TiSA after Brexit’, Journal of International Economic Law, 20/3: 583–625 (2017), 
p. 595; Articles 8.4–8.5, Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (European 
Union-Canada).
118 Ana Paula Cusolito, Raed Safadi and Daria Taglioni, Include Global Value Chains – Policy 
Options in Trade and Complementary Areas for gvc Integration by Small and Medium En-
terprises and Low-Income Developing Countries (Washington, dc: International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank and oecd, 2016), pp. 77–78; 1995 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (adopted 15 April 1994; entered into 
force 1 January 1995), unts 1868: 186.
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to be eligible for a fit.119 In fact, the usage of lcrs in the res sector has in-
creased since 2009.120 These lcrs require the investor to, in one form or an-
other, hire local contractors or use a minimum percentage of local materials 
and hire a minimum percentage of local employees for their project. These 
requirements have a significant impact on the risks involved in the different 
stages of the project. Among the risks which lcrs impact are counterparty or 
participant risks. These risks concern the necessity to carry out a test to estab-
lish the creditworthiness of each of the participants, contractors and equity 
partners in a project.121 lcrs also affect which companies can be dealt with, 
and thus have a strong impact on these risks depending on the details of the 
lcrs involved and the financial stability of the relevant companies established 
in the host country.
In case new res generation facilities have to be constructed through green-
field investments, pre-completion phase risks come into play which include 
construction, technological, planning and design risks.122 The success of an on-
time and on-budget construction strongly depends on the expertise, knowledge 
and experience of the contractors and the reliability of the technologies and 
materials used. lcrs thus significantly impact the project, for example when 
the knowledge and expertise required is not present in the host country to pro-
vide the required technologies or construction, installation and maintenance 
services. The mentioned risks are not limited to the pre-completion phase, 
but also impact operation, maintenance and possible issues encountered dur-
ing decommissioning.123 Operating risks include performance standards that 
119 Jan-Christoph Kuntze and Tom Moerenhout, ‘Are Feed-in Tariff Schemes with Local Con-
tent Requirements Consistent with wto Law?’ in Freya Baetens and José Caiado (eds.), 
Frontiers of International Economic Law – Legal Tools to Confront Interdisciplinary Chal-
lenges (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2014), p. 151; Matthew D’Orsi, ‘Heated Skirmishes in the Solar 
Sector: Do Solar-pv Feed-In Tariffs Constitute Trade-Related Investment Measures and 
Subsidies Prohibited under the wto Regime?’, The American University International Law 
Review 29/3: 673–716 (2014), pp. 681–682; Mysore Srikar, ‘Renewable Energy Programmes 
in the European Union, Japan and the United States – Compatibility with wto Law’, Cen-
tre for wto Studies (cws) Working Paper No. 200/4, 27 August 2012, https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2180806_code1800193.pdf?abstractid=2179621&mirid=1, 
accessed 1 November 2018.
120 oecd, Business and Finance Outlook, pp. 158–159; oecd, Overcoming Barriers to Interna-
tional Investment in Clean Energy, p. 50.
121 Dewar and Irwin, ‘Project Risks’, pp. 117–118.
122 Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice, pp. 45–47; McCormick, ‘Project Finance’, 
p. 791.
123 The extent to which developers are responsible for decommissioning costs depends per 
sector and country.
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are not reached, unexpected decreases in efficiency during the lifetime of the 
operation, and emission standards that are not met.124 Practice shows that 
technological risk can result in complicating factors and therefore increased 
operational and decommissioning costs. This particularly holds true for energy 
projects, since they are usually large and complex. Moreover, as great advance-
ments are being made in many res technologies, such as energy storage or 
windmills increasing in size, technological risks are abundant in res projects 
when they use ‘untested’ elements or innovative combinations of technolo-
gies. Naturally, risks are lower when investors work with contractors, technolo-
gies and materials that have a successful track record. Because of the inherent 
risks and the magnitude of the investments involved in the res sector, it is the 
obvious choice for (risk averse) investors to work with experienced parties.125
An effective manner for project developers to hedge risks is to require the 
contractors and the original oems to take a minority equity share in the proj-
ect, which is increasingly common for wind and solar oems.126 Many manu-
facturers of wind turbines and solar modules also provide for the majority of 
operation and maintenance services in the wind and solar sectors.127 In prac-
tice, this can mean that a contractor takes a 10 percent equity share worth, for 
example, eur 100 million which the contractor stands to lose if the project 
fails.128 This increased exposure is meant to work as an additional safeguard 
that the contractor will indeed perform conform the agreed timeline and 
costs. This way, the other project parties can hedge a multitude of risks related 
to construction and operation. Traditionally, the risks for non-completion, 
cost overruns, deficiencies and delayed completion were not retained by 
the project company or the lenders, but rather carried by the contractors or 
124 Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice, p. 47.
125 Dewar and Irwin, ‘Project Risks’, pp. 88–90.
126 Clean Energy Pipeline, ‘The European Renewable Energy Investor Landscape’, 2014, 
http://cleanenergypipeline.com/Resources/CE/ResearchReports/The%20European%20
Renewable%20Energy%20Investor%20Landscape.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, p. 11.
127 United States International Trade Commission, ‘Renewable Energy and Related Services’, 
p. xix.
128 Recently, lenders are less hesitant towards taking construction risks in the renewable en-
ergy sector as a result of the increased experience with technologies such as wind and 
solar pv and the experience gained by both the contractors and lenders in these sectors. 
In both corporate and project finance a balance is made between an increased contract-
ing price for transferring risk to the contractor, taking out separate insurance policies and 
assuming the risks.
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the sponsors.129 When the contractors carry the risk and are responsible 
for the decision on the most suitable technology, chances are that they will 
choose tried and tested technologies to limit their risks.130 When the sponsors 
make the decision, the chosen contractor and technology supplier may not co-
incide.131 This increases risks especially when technology of different oems is 
combined, as the choice may turn out to be unfeasible in practice while it may 
have been solid in theory. Where lcrs are in place, sponsors may not be able 
to work with sufficiently knowledgeable and experienced contractors and sup-
pliers and thus be forced to take decisions and risks they otherwise would not. 
res projects have been perceived as high in technological risk because of the 
innovative character of the technologies used.132 Hence, lcrs increase the cost 
of capital where they force developers to make use of products and contractors 
without a proven track record which exposes the project to additional risks. 
These risks have a significant impact because the whole project has failed from 
a technical point of view if performance tests fail.133 In addition, lcrs increase 
transaction costs as developers – which are required to work with local person-
nel, materials and services – will have to overcome an information deficiency 
to establish the availability, experience and expertise of local suppliers, which 
may be difficult and expensive considering physical distances and language 
barriers.
In this manner, the use of lcrs can adversely affect a project, especially 
when the required knowledge and expertise in technology and personnel is not 
available in the host country. Even in case it is, the lcrs impose transaction 
costs as they force companies to carry out due diligence and market research 
in the host country which may not be necessary if they were allowed to work 
with partners of their choice, with whom they have previous work experience. 
For these reasons, it is not surprising that international investors have labelled 
129 Dewar and Irwin, ‘Project Risks’, pp. 87–89. Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice, 
p. 47. The sponsors are the equity partners in a project company, thus those holding the 
shares of the project company.
130 Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice, p. 46; Dewar and Irwin, ‘Project Risks’, p. 90.
131 Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice, p. 46.
132 Ibid. As a result of the risks involved, where risk averse investors are involved, such as pen-
sion funds, unknown technologies would not be used. The use of less understood technol-
ogies will also be less prevalent and where used increase the cost of capital. Allan Marks 
and Jenna Darler, ‘International Projects – Sector Focus Section D – Renewable Energy’, in 
Dewar, International Project Finance Law and Practice, p. 200.
133 Gatti, Project Finance in Theory and Practice, p. 46.
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lcrs as ‘the main policy impediment to international investment across the 
solar and wind-energy value chain’.134
Besides creating barriers to trade and investment in the res sector, lcrs can 
also form a potential regulatory risk associated with an investment. In Russia, 
for example, the required level of local content may be changed ex post facto 
by the authorities, even in relation to existing investments.135 In the worst-case 
scenario this could mean that a project loses its entitlement to financial sup-
port because the raised lcr is not met by the facility while, once completed, it 
becomes very difficult – both technically as well as financially – to increase the 
amount of local content.
Of course, the impact of lcrs on res may differ from technology to technol-
ogy. In the case of solar panels, for example, one can easily assemble solar pan-
els in one country and ship them worldwide in a container while in the case 
of wind turbines it might be more convenient to establish a local subsidiary 
or joint venture in a market because of the complexities associated with the 
transport, export and installation of wind turbine towers, nacelles, and blades.
The financial consequences of lcrs can be demonstrated by reference to 
the lcrs in the fit schemes of the Canadian provinces of Quebec and On-
tario. According to one study, these lcrs have increased the costs of installed 
wind capacity with approximately ‘usd 386 per kilowatt of electric capacity’, 
amounting to 14 percent of the total costs per kilowatt of installed capacity; 
this made Canadian wind capacity significantly more expensive than wind tur-
bine capacity in the United States.136 Translated to the costs of a 600 mw wind 
farm, which can power up to 785.000 households and reduce co2 emissions by 
1,25 million ton per year, an lcr with similar impact would increase the cost 
of the project by usd 231 million.137 In that regard, policy alignment between 
green policy objectives and industrial policy objectives is desirable.138
134 oecd, Overcoming Barriers to International Investment in Clean Energy, p. 50.
135 Anatole Boute, Russian Electricity and Energy Investment Law (Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015), 
p. 527.
136 Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, Local Content Requirements – A Global Problem (Wash-
ington, dc: Peterson Institute for Economic Studies 2013), pp. 71–73.
137 To get to this number: 386*1.000 (to get the additional cost per mw instead of kw) = 
386.000. 386.000*600 (to get the additional costs for a wind project of 600 mw) = 
231.600.000. For the statistics of the wind farm, see http://geminiwindpark.nl/feiten-- 
cijfers.html, accessed 1 November 2018. It should be noted that the total costs for the 600 
mw offshore wind farm Gemini were eur 2.99 billion, while the more recent 700 mw 
wind farm Borssele iii and iv cost closer to eur 1.5 billion.
138 In fact, it has been argued that removing lcrs can increase output and employment 
in countries that maintain such measures: Monkelbaan, ‘Using Trade for Achieving the 
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Contrary to the international trade regime, where lcrs in res schemes 
have been challenged successfully and effectively,139 provisions in existing iias 
regarding lcrs have proven to be largely ineffective. This is due to the fact 
that the investment protection provisions in iias – including those on lcrs – 
only apply to government measures that were adopted after an investment was 
made, due to the non-retroactive application of treaties.140 In a sector where 
investments are still to a large extent regulatory driven, this means that inves-
tors are not able to challenge aspects of regulatory frameworks that have been 
adopted prior to the investment, even if it in principle violates international 
obligations.
An interesting example of a recent Free Trade Agreement (fta) that ad-
dresses lcrs in the res sector is the eu-Vietnam fta which contains a specific 
chapter on ‘non-tariff barriers to trade and investment in renewable energy 
generation’.141 This chapter explicitly prohibits lcrs that affect ‘the other 
sdgs’, p. 590; Veena Jha, ‘Removing Trade Barriers on Selected Renewable Energy Prod-
ucts in the Context of Energy Sector Reforms: Modelling the Environmental and Eco-
nomic Impacts in a General Equilibrium Framework’, October 2013, https://www.ictsd.
org/sites/default/files/downloads/2013/12/removing-trade-barriers-on-selected-renew-
able-energy-products-in-the-context-of-energy-sector-reforms.pdf, accessed 1 November 
2018, p. 32.
139 Within the context of the wto, the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures 
(trims Agreement) specifies that such requirements are contrary to the national treat-
ment obligation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt). See Canada – 
Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector and Canada – Mea-
sures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, wt/ds412/ab/r wt/ds426/ab/r, Reports of 
the Appellate Body, 6 May 2013; India – Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar 
Modules, wt/ds456/ab/r, Report of the Appellate Body, 16 September 2016; Article 2(1) 
of the 1995 wto Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (adopted 15 April 
1994, entered into force 1 January 1995), unts 1868: 186; Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio and 
Arwel Davies, World Trade Law – Text, Cases and Commentary (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2014), p. 671.
140 Articles 5, 10(11) and 11 of the Energy Charter Treaty; Articles 1106 and 1107 of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (United States-Canada-Mexico) (adopted 17 December 
1992; entered into force 1 January 1994), ilm 32: 289. See also Mesa Power Group, llc v. 
Government of Canada, uncitral, pca Case No. 2012–17, Award, 24 March 2016, paras. 
320–335; Cees Verburg, ‘Local Content Requirements in Renewable Energy Schemes – 
Government Procurement or a Violation of International Obligations?’, International En-
ergy Law Review 35/5: 185–197 (2017), pp. 190–197.
141 Chapters 8 and 14 of the eu-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement (European Union-Vietnam) 
(adopted 17 October 2018; not in force), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index 
.cfm?id=1437, accessed 1 November 2018.
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Party’s products, service suppliers, investors or investments’.142 Also, manda-
tory local equity participation requirements are prohibited subject to a few 
exceptions.143 Finally, it also states with regards to technical standards and reg-
ulations, that the contracting parties shall make use of international standards 
to the extent possible. Nevertheless, the obligations arising under the chapter 
on renewable energy generation are merely enforceable under the inter-state 
dispute settlement mechanism and can, as such, not be enforced by private 
parties.144
4 Liberalizing res Trade and Investment: The Host State Perspective
In the previous sections, it was argued that liberalizing trade and investment 
in the entire value chain of the res sector can contribute to lower costs of res 
which should facilitate the deployment of res technologies. In doing so, the 
authors primarily adopted a micro-economic approach by analysing measures 
from the perspective of an investor. Since most res technologies are current-
ly in the hands of a limited number of companies, from primarily developed 
countries, this instinctively would lead to the conclusion that the benefits of 
trade and investment liberalization would be harvested by companies from de-
veloped countries. Since trade and investment agreements are to be concluded 
on the basis of reciprocity, an equilibrium which reflects the interests from all 
countries involved has to be reached. Hence, one has to identify the benefits 
that liberalization would entail for host states. Although this section deviates 
from the general micro-economic approach adopted in this article, the authors 
feel it is important to underline certain macro-economic benefits that may be 
associated with liberalization as the narrative is incomplete without a discus-
sion thereof.
Even if a country is only marginally involved in the value chain of res tech-
nology, project development and operation offers plenty of opportunity to 
reap local economic benefits: ‘Downstream’ activities in the pv sector are more 
labour intensive than ‘upstream’ activities, such as module manufacturing.145 
142 Ibid., Chapter 14, Article 4(1)(a).
143 Ibid., Chapter 14, Article 4(1)(b).
144 Ibid., Chapter 13.
145 ey, ‘Solar pv Jobs and Value Added in Europe’, November 2017, https://www.ey.com/ 
Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-solar-pv-jobs-and-value-added-in-europe/$FILE/EY-solar 
-pv-jobs-and-value-added-in-europe.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, p. 9; Ferruccio 
Ferroni and Robert Hopkirk, ‘Energy Return on Energy Invested (ERoEI) for Photovoltaic 
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irena, for example, estimates that in the case of pv projects, pv modules and 
inverters account for 40 percent of the costs of the project.146 Balance of sys-
tem costs account for the remaining 60 percent, which covers non-module 
hardware (cables, grid connection, racking and mounting, safety and secu-
rity, and monitoring and control), installation costs (mechanical and electric 
installations, inspections, and ground preparation), and certain ‘soft costs’ 
(application for financial support, permitting, system design, acquisition and 
financing, and operation costs).147 Wind energy may offer even more potential 
as a local assembly site is often preferred due to the challenges associated with 
transporting large wind turbine components, such as the tower, nacelle and 
blades.
Services associated with res projects provide the clearest economic oppor-
tunity for countries that are barely integrated in the value chain of res hard-
ware. oems often sell generation equipment in combination with services 
in their contracts, by providing for transport, construction and maintenance 
services.148 The reason that trade in goods and services in the res sector are 
intrinsically intertwined is related to the high tech nature of the sector: It has 
been said that the deployment of res technology lies ‘around the top of the 
complexity ladder’.149 This means that the purchaser of a wind turbine will 
most likely not only be interested in the physical hardware, but also in the 
knowledge and skills required to deploy and operate a wind turbine. Conse-
quently, ‘they seek to acquire these goods in combination with ancillary ser-
vices such as installation, technical support, training and maintenance’.150 To 
Solar Systems in Regions of Moderate Insolation’, Energy Policy, 94: 336–344 (2016), p. 339; 
Monkelbaan, ‘Trade in Sustainable Energy Services’, pp. 32–35.
146 irena, Renewable Energy Benefits – Leveraging Local Capacity for Solar pv (Abu Dhabi: 
irena, 2017), p. 10.
147 irena, The Power to Change: Solar and Wind Cost Reduction Potential to 2025 (Abu Dhabi: 
irena, 2016), p. 31.
148 United States International Trade Commission, ‘Renewable Energy and Related Servic-
es’, pp. xix and xx; Meléndez-Ortiz and Sugathan, ‘Enabling the Energy Transition and 
Scale-Up of Clean Energy Technologies’, p. 944; Tilak Doshi, ‘Sector Study on Environ-
mental Services: Renewable Energy’, October 2017, https://www.apec.org/-/media/APEC/ 
Publications/2017/10/Sector-Study-on-Environmental-Services-Renewable-Energy/217 
_PSU_Environmental-Services_Renewable-Energy.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, 
pp. 3–5.
149 Jehan Sauvage and Christina Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environ-
ment’, oecd Trade and Environment Working Papers 2017/02, 9 May 2017, https://www 
.oecd-ilibrary.org/deliver/dc99bf2b-en.pdf?itemId=%2Fcontent%2Fpaper%2Fdc99bf2b 
-en&mimeType=pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, p. 9.
150 Ibid.
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put the res goods and services sectors in perspective: It has been said that the 
market value for res services is estimated at twice the size of res goods.151 
Also, the less mature a market for res goods and related services is in a given 
country, the more inputs will have to be imported to successfully develop a proj-
ect.152 According to the oecd, wind and solar projects in the least-developed 
countries are particularly reliant on imported goods and services because of 
the lack of a local industry.153 In countries which lack the highly skilled la-
bour force required for the development of res projects, imports can over-
come the skill gap in the short term while contributing to the development of 
a local res services sector in the long term.154 In practice, the establishment 
of a local commercial presence by foreign res services providers is the most 
important method to supply services.155 From a development perspective, the 
establishment of local subsidiaries by foreign res companies offers interest-
ing opportunities as research shows that these companies often rely on local 
personnel.156 This also means that there are many opportunities for local job 
creation, transfer of skills and knowledge, and local partnerships.157 Especially 
for the operation and maintenance phase of a project, employing local person-
nel is often more cost efficient than constantly relying on foreign personnel. 
Besides establishing a local presence, the presence of foreign natural persons 
is also a common mode of services supply in the res sector.158 According to 
the oecd, ‘the temporary presence of highly skilled foreign personnel and the 
151 Monkelbaan, ‘Using Trade for Achieving the sdgs’, p. 584.
152 Louis Tse and Oluwatobi Oluwatola, ‘Evaluating Renewable Energy Technology Transfer 
in Developing Countries: Enabling Factors & Barriers’, Journal of Science Policy & Gover-
nance 6/1: 1–10 (2015), p. 6.
153 Steenblik and Grosso, ‘Trade in Services Related to Climate Change’, p. 10.
154 International Labour Organization and European Union, ‘Research Brief – Investment 
in Renewable Energy Generates Jobs – Supply of Skilled Workforce Needs to Catch Up’, 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/---ifp_skills/documents/publica-
tion/wcms_168354.pdf, accessed 1 November 2018, pp. 6–7.
155 United States International Trade Commission, ‘Renewable Energy and Related Services’, 
pp. 2–19; Sauvage and Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’, p. 10; 
Camilla Prawitz and Magnus Rentzhog, ‘Making Green Trade Happen – Environmen-
tal Goods and Indispensable Services’, December 2014, https://www.kommers.se/Docu-
ments/dokumentarkiv/publikationer/2014/Making-Green-Trade-Happen_webb.pdf, 
accessed 1 November 2018, p. 17.
156 Sauvage and Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’, p. 11; Doshi, ‘Sector 
Study on Environmental Services’, p. 29.
157 Sauvage and Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’, p. 27; Monkelbaan, 
‘Trade in Sustainable Energy Services’, p. 33.
158 Doshi, ‘Sector Study on Environmental Services’, p. 6.
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establishment of a foreign commercial presence may provide opportunities 
for person-to-person communication and learning by doing’.159 Given the con-
troversial nature of this mode of services supply, as it relates directly to labour 
and immigration policies, barriers to trade in services through this mode are 
manifold.160
The liberalization of trade and investment in the res sector is thus expected 
to also create opportunities for technology sharing and capacity building, in 
line with sdg 17.161 For any country which aspires integration in the global 
value chains of res technology – which should be beneficial in terms of sdg 8 
concerning employment and economic growth as set out above and central to 
realize sdgs 7 and 13 concerning sustainable energy for all and the promotion 
of res to mitigate emissions and combat climate change – building up local 
capacity and human resources in this area is indispensable. In turn, and in 
line with sdg 7.A, res trade and investment liberalization may also enhance 
international cooperation – especially between private parties – which can fa-
cilitate access to res technology concerning res goods and services. Consider-
ing the urgency with which investments in res are required in light of climate 
change and the difficulties which have characterized traditional technology 
sharing, providing access to foreign investors allows the host state to move for-
ward. The aforementioned benefits which the host state thus enjoys may be a 
multitude greater than those potentially gained from the introduction of lcrs 
and the consequently more limited inflow of investments.
5 Conclusion
Developing renewable energy projects is paramount to the realization of vari-
ous sdgs. Financing the required energy transition before 2050 has been esti-
mated to require usd 3.5 trillion annually.162 These investments must be made 
across the globe, as all countries have to transition towards a system in which 
159 oecd, ‘Managing Request-offer Negotiations under the gats: the Case of Energy Ser-
vices’, td/tc/wp(2003)24/final, 5 November 2003, p. 15.
160 Sauvage and Timiliotis, ‘Trade in Services Related to the Environment’, p. 11; Prawitz and 
Rentzhog, ‘Making Green Trade Happen’, p. 17.
161 See for example: Sébastien Miroudot, ‘The Linkages between Open Services Markets and 
Technology Transfer’, oecd Trade Policy Papers No. 29, 27 January 2006, https://www 
.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/723726052723.pdf?expires=1543927395&id=id&accname= 
guest&checksum=8DC3688497B41137B623F17BC2A841FA, accessed 1 November 2018, in 
particular pp. 16–21 and 46.
162 International Energy Agency, Perspectives for the Energy Transition, p. 8.
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the energy consumed originates from modern and sustainable energy sources 
as aimed for by sdg 7.1.
The latest statistics are, however, disconcerting. In 2017, global energy in-
vestments were down, for the third consecutive year, to usd 1.8 trillion while 
investments in the res sector were down by 7 percent.163 A recent report 
by the United Nations indicates that global flows of fdi across all economic 
sectors were down by 23 percent in 2017 in comparison to 2016.164 The report 
observed increased hostility towards fdi and stagnation in investments in 
global value chains.165 In light of the recent international political tensions 
concerning investment and trade, the prospects are sobering.
International law can nevertheless play an important role in attracting for-
eign investment and lowering transactions costs and the cost of capital. In the 
quest to unlock the private capital necessary to finance an energy transition, 
research has shown that limiting legal, regulatory and political risks is instru-
mental to attract investors. Practice in the past years has shown that legal 
certainty cannot be guaranteed in developing nor developed countries where 
it concerns the legal framework governing electricity production from res. 
As the Spanish cases demonstrate, changes in the regulatory framework and 
especially in the financial support offered to the project can have devastating 
effects on the financial viability of res projects that are often very vulnerable 
to significant changes in cash flow. In these cases, iias can provide for effective 
investment protection. Nevertheless, in order to mitigate perceived and actual 
investment risks it is desirable that the application of existing iias becomes 
more predictable. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how iias can actively promote 
investment by protecting it.
Besides promoting fdi by protecting it, there are multiple other areas where 
iias can have an impact by removing barriers to investment that adversely af-
fect flows of fdi and trade in the res supply chain. Ideally, a supportive and 
predictable international legal framework concerning res investments would 
cover all stages of the supply chain of renewable energy, not just project de-
velopment or the post-establishment protection thereof. This is particularly 
relevant since empirical evidence demonstrates that iias which are limited to 
ex post investment protection may only have a marginal effect on flows of fdi. 
An area which should receive much more attention in practice and discourse 
163 International Energy Agency, World Energy Investment 2018 (Bonn: iea, 2018), https://
webstore.iea.org/world-energy-investment-2018, accessed 1 November 2018, p. 11.
164 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2018, 
unctad/wir/2018 (Geneva: United Nations, 2018), pp. xi–xii.
165 Ibid.
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is that of market access. International investment law can play a vital role in 
allowing for market access by foreign investors. Investment treaties can further 
promote investments by limiting the ability of states to adopt protectionist 
legislation which increases the cost of res projects. Since 2009 the use of pro-
tectionist measures, either in the form of lcrs or the application of trade rem-
edies, affecting the res sector has been on the rise. Motivated by the desire to 
create or protect local jobs in an emerging industry with great potential, many 
states have adopted trade barriers that in most cases will lead to increased 
prices by reducing economic efficiency. Instead of devoting efforts to obtain 
the largest possible piece which the economic renewable energy ‘pie’ has to 
offer, states would be better advised to increase the size of the ‘pie’ as much as 
possible by creating an international legal framework which facilitates trade 
and investment in the res sector.
Over the last few years, research and innovation in the res sector has 
contributed significantly to lower costs to the extent that res are nearly price-
competitive with alternative sources of energy in some jurisdictions. More-
over, a number developers of large scale projects have been awarded licenses 
without requiring any subsidies. From the moment that subsidies are no lon-
ger required, one might expect that the integration of res will no longer be 
primarily regulatory driven, but also market driven. In order to reach this tip-
ping point as soon as possible and unleash the market forces in the pursuit 
of climate change mitigation, barriers to international trade and investment 
which from a micro-economic point of view are troublesome, should be avoid-
ed. International investment law, ideally in combination with rules on trade 
in comprehensive ftas, can contribute to the realization of such conditions 
through ensuring market access, prohibiting protectionist measures and pro-
viding investment protection.
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